ABSTRACT In this paper, we explored the application of the fractional calculus to digital watermarking. In order to reach this goal, we chose a set of watermarking systems, and then, we altered the watermark detection step of each system. The novelty of our proposal is that we deviated from the trend of proposing new embedding domains computed by using fractional calculus principles. Instead, we proposed to reformulate the detection equation set. Then, this paper contributes to a new equation set for detecting watermarks based on fractional calculus principles. In addition, we provided the proper order for the derivative; this equation set replaces the previous one, given as a result that the detection rate increased up to 88% for the best case compared to the original equation set. The main modification was to replace the system's equations to another set that we derived by using the Riemann-Liouville fractional operator. To verify that if this approach is effective, we performed tests on grayscale images of size 512 × 512; the test covered several attacks including noise addition, JPEG compression, and scaling. The results showed that the modified systems detected more watermarks than their counterparts. The proposed scheme presented better results for 15 out of 21 different tests and the other 6 ended in a draw. It is important to remark that the behavior holds for other embedding domains, for example, the discrete cosine transform coefficients and the singular values decomposition values, which suggests the regularity of the approach.
I. INTRODUCTION TO DIGITAL WATERMARKING
The main idea behind digital watermarking is: to embed a signal called the watermark into a signal named the host, this produces the watermarked signal. The algorithm that does this job is called the encoder the purpose of the watermark detector focuses on checking if the signal is watermarked, then the designer constructs the decoder for computing the detection statistics and performing a binary decision.
An equally important topic is the system security. In the security scenario, the attacker performs a signal processing operation on a watermarked signal; who seeks to damaging the watermark making it impossible to detect, thus the attack is successful and as a consequence, the attacker can reclaim the ownership of the signal. However, if the watermarking system is robust, no attacker can remove the watermark without damaging the signal. Because of this, a goal for a system designer is that the product of any successful attack is a worthless signal.
Watermarking has applications to copyright enforcement; such applications require high robustness algorithms since the goal is that the attacker cannot remove and distribute or sell the attacked signal. Another application is the authentication of digital content; in this case, any attack wipes the watermark; the rationale of these applications is that if the decoder cannot detect the watermark, then it means that an attacker forged the signal.
Early watermarking systems evolved increasing their complexity as new as proposals emerged. It was proposed to apply a transformed embedding domain to develop more robust systems, giving as a result, that the overall complexity raised according to the complexity of the transform.
In order to circumvent such issue, we propose to rework the detection equations instead of using a transform domain for watermark embedding, then a given watermarking system can increase its detection rate without increasing its complexity needless. Before getting into details, we will give a background on the topics needed.
The organization of the remaining of this paper is: in section II, we introduce the communication model used for watermarking; then, section III contains a brief introduction to the basics of fractional calculus, section IV,is a a review of the state of the art of fractional calculus applied to digital watermarking. In section V we explain the proposed reformulation of watermarking systems; we present the experimental results in the subsequent section VI; the section VII contains the analysis and discussion of the experimental results, and finally, section VIII, the conclusions and future work.
II. INTRODUCTION TO THE WATERMARKING COMMUNICATION MODEL
A typical approach is to consider watermarks as signals transmitted through a channel to a receiver that must detect the watermark within the host. In this context, a host signal is the communication channel, the watermark plays the role of a signal that propagates through this channel, the distortion caused by the host signal to the watermark represents nonideal characteristics of the channel and attacks are the source of the noise. In general, Fig. 1 depicts a watermark propagation model. The variables of the model include: the host signal (X ), which will be particularized to the case of grayscale images in the remaining of this paper; a watermark (W ) which is a pseudorandom signal generated by using a key provided by the user, and the source of noise.
For the sake of simplicity, let us consider first the case where the pixels of the image compose the embedding domain, moreover, let us assume that the pixels of grayscale images are re-ordered into a vector. Under this agreement, the form of the watermarks used in this work is W = [w 1 , w 2 , w 3 , . . . , w N ] for a vector watermark of length N ; without loss of generality, binary watermarks hold the following properties: w i ∈ {−1, 1}∀i and their parameters are: zero mean and variance 1; for Gaussian watermarks, it holds w i has a Gaussian Probability Density Function (PDF). The encoder embeds the watermark within the cover X = [x 1 , x 2 , x 3 , . . . , x N ] so we get the watermarked signal Y = [y 1 , y 2 , y 3 , . . . , y N ]. The watermark detector receives Y * which is a noisy version of Y , so often, the watermark is distorted. 2 illustrates the embedding process: a user provides a key used for generating the watermark, usually the key is a seed value for some pseudo-random number generator, then the embedding gain value sets the watermark's energy, and embed the watermark into the host signal producing a watermarked image.
There is a relationship between the embedding gain and robustness since high gain values are tied to high robustness, however, this also decreases the imperceptibility, so a common approach is to fix the embedding gain a value that maintains a balance between robustness and imperceptibility.
The embedding process consists of modifying the pixels of the image according to an embedding rule, in this case, we study the additive rule, this changes the values of the pixels in this way:
where x i is the host signal, g is the embedding gain and y i is the watermarked signal. And as stated before, x i are the luminance pixel values of the image. Now, the designer must construct a system for detecting the watermark. There are many approaches to accomplish this task, for example, some of them perform the embedding steps backward. Other approaches exploit the statistical model of the channel and make use of an optimization criterion that leads to a detection equation, some examples of these criteria are the maximum likelihood method, and the NeymanPearson test. In this study, we consider the case of a Gaussian channel; a Gaussian channel is a channel that is modeled using Gaussian PDF with parameters µ and σ 2 .
The presence of the watermark has to be assessed; to reach this goal, two statistics have to be computed: a detection variable and a threshold, the former is a statistic of the presence of a given watermark in a signal, and the latter is a value that is used as a reference. If the measured variable is greater or equal to the threshold, then the watermark is considered to be present in the host; otherwise, the watermark is considered to be absent. The watermark detection is illustrated in Fig. 3 ; The computed statistics are denoted as d (the decision variable) and T h (the threshold). The cross-correlation is widely used for pattern matching applications [1] . This detection equation has been used since early works on digital watermarking systems, one of the most influential was the paper by Cox et al. [2] , which has inspired many works. Despite the method used, many watermarking systems use a correlation-based detector with the form:
where w i is the i-th element of the watermark; y * i is the ith sample of the received watermarked signal and N is the number of samples in each signal.
Other way to state the cross-correlation equation for watermark detection is:
here, the watermark X is compared for similarity to the corrupted watermark X * ;vit is easy to see that both (2) and (3) are the same mathematical operation. Many works use (2) for detecting the watermark as stated before, however, it can be proved that it is optimal for the case when the additive embedding method was used and the channel can be modeled using a Gaussian PDF, and hence any other case might be suboptimal [3] .
The optimal threshold is derived in [4] , it can be proved that the threshold for this detection equation is:
We can particularize a watermarking system that uses (2) and (4) as shown in Fig. 4 . Equations (2) and (4) are the statistics d and T h discussed early in this paper and we will use them later in this paper for comparison since, as discussed above, they are the optimal cases. In (4), σ 2 Y is the variance of the watermarked image.
III. FRACTIONAL CALCULUS BASICS
In order to introduce the fractional calculus concept, let us consider first the typical notation for higher order derivatives:
Classical calculus consider the order of the derivative (α) as an integer, for this reason, classical calculus will be referred as integer calculus. On the other hand, fractional calculus is a generalization of calculus where α is a real number.
A natural step forward is to find practical applications for the new technique, so, many applications of fractional calculus are under development. As a result, current applications of fractional calculus exhibit advantages when compared to systems based on integer calculus. To probe further on recent applications to engineering, we suggest to read [5] - [17] .
A point to consider as an issue in the field of fractional calculus is that many mathematicians are working on a general definition of the formulas, and as a result, each author have proposed a different equation for the same formulas. One example is the Riemann-Liouville (RL) fractional operator fractional derivative of order α; defined as:
Note that when α = 1, (6) lead to the same results of integer calculus.
VOLUME 6, 2018
IV. FRACTIONAL CALCULUS APPLICATIONS TO DIGITAL WATERMARKING
In this section, we review works in the field of Digital Watermarking that exploit the theory of fractional calculus.
A. THE GRÜNWALD-LETNIKOV FRACTIONAL DERIVATIVE
For example, Huading and Yifei [18] compute a pseudorandom sine function, they use the Grünwald-Letnikov fractional derivative on that signal fixing fractional orders α and β. The GL derivative of sine functions with frequency ω 0 is:
An attacker must compute the fractional orders α and β, in addition, the proper selection of an initial phase parameter makes difficult for it to forge the watermark, and as a result the attacker has to find out three keys: two fractional orders of the derivatives (α and β), and the initial phase φ 0 . Another degree of security is achieved by relating the sampling frequency to the fractional orders.
The authors use the following method to construct the watermark: first, the wavelet transform decompose the host up to three decomposition levels, this results in the coefficient sets: LL, LH , HL, HH . Then, the authors use coefficients LL for watermark embedding using the additive rule as follows:
The watermarked coefficients (LL) replace the original coefficient set (LL), and then compute the inverse wavelet transform using coefficient sets LL, LH , HL, HH . The system detects the watermark using the cross-correlation:
Where W i,j is the watermark that has to be located within the media and W i,j is the received watermark, both in the wavelet domain.
Unfortunately, the authors do not show enough evidence of system's reliability, the robustness or any other argument that support the reliability of the proposed system.
B. THE FRACTIONAL CAUCHY FORMULA
The work [19] is as the proposal presented in [18] . In both papers, authors use the fractional derivative of sine functions to build the watermark, the systems embed the watermark into the coefficient set computed using the discrete wavelet domain. An important difference between those works is that Miao et al. [19] use the fractional Cauchy formula for the sine function, now the system derives the sine signal with initial phase φ 0 letting fractional orders be α and β, in this way the system generates a scrambled watermarkw i according to the following rule:
where g is the embedding gain, and ω 0 is the frequency of the sine signal. Then, the system embeds the watermark into the wavelet coefficients which are computed using the Haar wavelet set; the image is divided into blocks of size 8 × 8 and the second level wavelet transform is computed, next the system embeds the watermark. The HH coefficient set is used for watermark embedding by using the additive rule described early in this paper.
The system detects the watermark using the crosscorrelation formula:
where W i is the mean of the watermark W i in the wavelet domain, and W i is the mean of the recovered watermark W i . Authors report that this watermarking system is robust, however their results are supported by the test in just one image, and also, they only discuss one attack briefly, this is not enough evidence to confirm the system's reliability.
C. THE FRACTIONAL FOURIER TRANSFORM
There are many works that exploit the advantages of the Fractional Fourier Transform (FrFT); the FrFT is a generalization of the Fourier Transform, and its result is a mixture of time and frequency domains [20] ; there are many mathematical definitions for the FrFT, some works in the watermarking field use the following definition: for any f (x) ∈ L 2 (R) with fractional order α, the FrFT is defined as:
The kernel K (α) (u, x) is defined as:
where q(u, x, φ) = exp j
2 cot φ − j ux csc φ and u represents a variable in the α-th fractional domain whereas φ = απ 2 can be interpreted as a rotation angle in the phase plane. The FT is a special case of FrFT when φ = π 2 . The FrFT is separable, that is to say, the 2D FrFT can be computed using the 1D FrFT formula by applying the transform rowwise and then column-wise, the, the FrFT is defined as:
where
Another algorithm is proposed in [21] also uses the FrFT as the embedding domain; the system changes the phase of the resulting coefficients. Authors report good results, unfortunately, they only present a case of study, thus, although the result is interesting, there is not enough evidence to support their work.
Furthermore, another similar approach is presented in [22] . The system performs the steps: first permute the image, then divide the image into non overlapping blocks (B i,j ) at row i and column j, next apply the 2D FrFT on each block and fixing the two fractional orders α and β in this way:
,j ]; now, embed the watermark into the main skew diagonal of the resulting FrFT coefficients using a random array K according to the rule:
is assembled from all watermarked blocks (Y (u, v) i,j ), the watermarked image in the spatial domain Y is got by reversing the 2D FrFT and inverting the initial permutation. As previously discussed approaches, the fractional orders α and β are the secret keys.
Decoder extracts the the watermark by following the embedding steps backward, that is to say, permute the watermarked image, and divide it into non overlapping blocks, then compute the FrFT on each block and then compute the correlation between the transformed block of the watermarked image (A i,j ) and the block of the watermark (B i,j ) according to:
. (17) whereĀ andB are the mean values of blocks A i,j and B i,j
The value of each element of the watermark is computed as follows:
Finally, the watermark is detected using standard crosscorrelation:
Authors claim that the system is robust toward JPEG compression, noise addition, and image manipulation operations such as median filtering, Gaussian smoothing, and sharpening filtering.
One more proposal is [23] , the authors present an interesting idea. Unlike most watermarking schemes, their system does not embed a watermark into a host image, but they use Visual Cryptography (VC) and a Visual Secret Sharing Scheme. Their method is: the system constructs two pseudo random signals that do not seem to carry any useful information, these signals, called the shares, convey a secret message. These two shares are named the master and the ownership shares; the first is generated using the Singular Values Decomposition (SVD) of the host image, and the second one, is generated using both the watermark and the master share.
Encoder generates the master share following the next steps: divide the host image into blocks of size 4 × 4, then select a set of blocks and compute the FrFT using orders α and β, compute the SVD of the transformed blocks and use the first value of the resulting SVD for computing the master share according to the standard rules of secret sharing schemes.
The authors report that their scheme resists various signal processing operations such as JPEG compression, average filtering, median filtering, blurring filtering, sharpening filtering, Gaussian noise addition, contrast adjustment, gamma correction, histogram equalization, resizing, rotation, and geometrical distortion.
Another approach that uses the FrFT is [24] . In this proposal, the signal x i,j is transformed using fractional orders α and β, then re-arrange X
i−1 }; omit the first L coefficients and embed the watermark into the following M coefficients according to the following rule:
where (ẇ i ,ẅ i ) is a real valued watermark key which is a gaussian white noise pattern with variance σ 2 w . The system detects the watermark using the following equation:
where Y i is the watermarked signal in the transformed domain.
Authors claimed their proposal is robust to geometrical transform, filtering, histogram stretching, among others. However, they do not support well their results since they present very few experiments.
Another proposal is [25] , in this case, the authors present an approach based on the FrFT with the addendum of a random modification to the phase; first, compute the watermark (W (u, v)) from a host image samples (X ) using the following equation:
where:
here, R(u, v) is the random phase generated in the FrFT domain. Samples a i,j , p i,j and p i,j are unknowns a priori, they have to be computed from W (u, v) and R(u, v), once the system computes a i,j and p i,j , both become the secret keys of the algorithm. Then, the system embeds the watermark using the following equation:
In summary, select a host image X and a watermark W , then, generate a random phase R(u, v), use (22)- (24) for computing the secret keys a i,j , p i,j , and employ them for watermark detection, in this way, the resulting system is more similar to a digital signature based system than to a typical watermarking system.
The system use a grayscale image as a watermark, and thus, the MSE seems a reasonable metric for detecting the watermark, the MSE definition for watermark verification used by this algorithm is:
This system is robust against the following attacks: cropping, salt and pepper noise addition, uniform noise addition, Gaussian noise addition, noise addition in both the amplitude and the phase, JPEG compression and, histogram equalization operations.
Another idea presented in [26] is to generate a watermark in the FrFT domain and embed it into an image also in the FrFT domain. First, multiply a watermark w(x, y) by exp [2 jπ r(u, x)], then compute the 1D FrFT with order α using this formula:
Then, compute the 1D FrFT using order β, in this way, they get the encrypted version of the watermark according to this relationship:
where functions r(u, x) and r(u, v) are two independent random functions with uniform distribution in the interval [0, 2π ], then embed the watermark sample W i,j into the image sample X i,j in the FrFT domain with gain g using the additive rule:
They do not discuss the detection of the watermark in detail, however, they state in the conclusions of this paper that used the cross-correlation for this purpose. This scheme is robust toward occlusion attack. However, the authors do not report results for any other attack.
D. THE RANDOM FRACTIONAL FOURIER TRANSFORM
A variation of the FrFT application is [27] ; it is focused in the use of the Random Fractional Fourier Transform (RFrFT); which has the same properties of FrFT but has the following advantage: the spectrum is random and exhibits a high embedding capacity and robustness for watermarking applications. The RFrFT mathematical definition is:
Functions P(x) and P * (x) are two random phase filters that are mutually complex conjugate. The authors do not provide further details on the characteristics of filters P(x) and P * (x).
The embedding process is as follows: first the RFrFT is computed with a given random phase, second, divide the transformed image into blocks and compute their fractal dimension; select a set of blocks for watermark embedding and use the highest amplitude in each block using Amplitude Shift Keying (ASK) as follows:
here, D [B(u, v) ] is the fractal dimension of block B(u, v) and D max is the maximum fractal dimension of all blocks. The watermark extraction is accomplished by reversing previous steps: use the highest amplitude of each block to estimate the watermark by using the following equation:
where Th is a threshold; B(u, v) and B(u, v) are blocks of the attacked watermarked image and the original host image, and thus it is not a blind algorithm. The authors compare both the extracted and the real watermark using the well known Mean Square Error to measure the robustness:
They tested their system by performing three attacks: noise addition, cropping and JPEG compression, however the number of tests is not enough for supporting their results.
E. THE DISCRETE FRACTIONAL RANDOM TRANSFORM
A proposal similar to previous approaches is presented in [28] ; the authors use the Discrete Fractional Random Transform (DFRNT). The DFRNT can be defined by the diagonal symmetrical random matrix Q, which is derived from the real-valued random matrix P with size N × N defined as:
Then, compute a kernel matrix R (α) , it holds the following relation:
These two matrices have the same eigenvectors since Q is symmetrical, next, normalize the eigenvectors to V Ri using the Schmidt normalization and they build on an eigenvector matrix of the form:
. Now, compute a coefficient matrix in this manner:
and then, express the kernel transform matrix as:
The 1D DFRNT definition is:
Whereas the 2D DFRNT is:
The embedding process steps are: apply the DFRNT; then, divide the signal into blocks; select a set of those blocks at random, then, select the highest amplitudes for watermark embedding using Phase Shift Keying (PSK), in ohter words, modify the phase according to:
where w i is the i-th element of the watermark and θ is an arbitrary angle that can be adjusted to meet a given distortion criterion.
The authors report that their proposal is robust against Gaussian noise addition, cropping, and low pass filtering, however, the tests do not support their work since the experiments carried out are too few: they tested their system on just one image and they only applied three attacks.
F. THE FRACTIONAL DUAL-TREE COMPLEX WAVELET TRANSFORM
Another proposal is the use of the Fractional Dual-Tree Complex Wavelet Transform (FrDT-WT); the FrDT-WT is used to find the wavelet transform in the Fourier domain resulting in a mathematical description of the multiresolution properties. For a finite energy signal f (x), the FrDT-WT definition is:
where ϕ i (t) and ψ j (t) are the scaling and wavelet functions respectively; the scaling coefficients E j0,n are derived from ϕ i (t) using inner product according to the formula:
The wavelet coefficients F j0,n are computed using the inner product with ψ i (t):
where K (α) (u, x) is the transform's kernel of order α.
As previous approaches do, in [29] exploit the randomness dependence of the FrDT-WT on order α; moreover, they use a biometric pattern to strengthen the security. The Speed Up Robust Features (SURF) is used to get robust matching vectors, then embed the watermark by changing the SVD vectors. In addition, there is a detection step that prevents problems related to the ambiguity of SVD based systems.
The main idea is to build two suitable biometric images named B 1 and B 2 ; then, use the SURF algorithm to compute the robust matching point vectors v 1 and v 2 . Use these vectors to compute the keys for building a chaotic map, compute the keys as:
The fractional orders are computed using the following equations:
. The fractional orders are in the interval [0, 1] The embedding process begins by randomizing the host image, then compute the l-th level FrDT-CWT with fractional orders (α, β) from the host image. Then, calculate the SVD of all sub-bands; the singular values (S s ) are modified according to the SVD of the watermark (S w ) with gain g using the additive rule defined as:
Then, reverse the SVD using the new S θ and invert the FrDT-CWT; the watermarked image is a randomized image, and thus, the final step is to reverse the randomization.
The watermark extraction use both, the original and the watermarked images; the previously discussed steps are performed in order to compare the singular values of both the original image (S o ) and the watermarked image ( S w ) as described in the following equation:
The authors report that their system is robust; the attacks covered in the test include average filtering, median filtering, Gaussian noise addition, salt and pepper noise addition, JPEG compression, SPIHT compression, row-column deletion, resizing, cropping, rotation, histogram equalization, contrast adjustment, and sharpen attacks. Unfortunately, even when results seem promising, the number of images used for the test were six images; furthermore, the authors admit that their results correspond to their best case. 
G. THE REDUNDANT FRACTIONAL WAVELET TRANSFORM
Another work is [30] , that is almost the same as the system presented in [29] . The main difference between these works is that [30] use the Redundant Fractional Wavelet Transform (RFrWT) due to a problem with the discrete FrWT related to the use of decimators. They adapted the system using the RFrWT, so the modifications are minor details.
All of the discussed works share the following characteristics: all of them use additive rule, exploit a fractional transform domain and use the cross-correlation formula for detecting watermarks. This is the main difference with our proposal. Other authors use the same equation for watermark detection (the cross-correlation formula), and propose a fractional transform domain for embedding the watermark, whereas we use a fractional detection equation, and exploit the same embedding domain, in other words, we propose to use the same embedding domain and use a different detection equation that is based on fractional calculus.
V. REFORMULATION OF CROSS-CORRELATION DETECTION EQUATIONS USING FRACTIONAL CALCULUS-BASED PRINCIPLES
The novelty of our proposal is that we formulate a fractional detection equation set whereas other authors propose to exploit an embedding domain, our approach is better since it detects watermarks where the original systems can not detect the watermark.
The proposed detection equations are introduced in this section; the equations will replace their counterparts in the selected systems, we start by assuming that the embedding rule is the additive rule, and the channel is Gaussian.
From (1), one can see that if g = 0, then, there is no watermark within the signal, thus we accomplish the detection of the watermark by estimating the value of the embedding gain, in an ideal case, the result of this estimation is the true value of g and zero otherwise, however practical detectors cannot reach the ideal behavior. To estimate the embedding gain, we will use the maximum likelihood method and the Neyman-Pearson Criterion, and this will lead to the system's detection equations.
Since the embedding rule defined by (1) , is easy to see that for Gaussian channels: x i = y i −gw i ∈ N (µ, σ ), so, assuming the observed samples in τ are independent and identically distributed, the likelihood function is:
FIGURE 6. Application of the proposed fractional equations to watermark detection. In order to simplify, the logarithm is taken, so the simplified function is: 
Recalling that w i has zero mean, thus
w i = 0 and w 2 i = 1∀i; making a few simplifications, (49 ) is reduced to:
At this stage, the classical approach calculate the integer derivative of (50) and set the result to zero, then compute an estimator of the embedding gain by solving the equation for variable g, we follow a similar strategy with the exception that VOLUME 6, 2018 we use a fractional derivative defined by (6) .
By equalling (51) to zero, and multiplying the result by g α , we get:
It is clear that it is a quadratic equation for g, and thus, by solving for the embedding gain, the estimator for g is: We use the positive root since by letting α = 1, (53) reduces to (2) as expected, leading to the same results reached by using the integer order derivative, on the other hand, the negative root leads to a contradiction. Now, by letting H = ln( √ 2π σ 2 e) be the entropy of the cover; we re-write (53) in this way:
By letting α ∈ R, the resulting estimation of g becomes a fractional estimator; now, we need to fix the proper fractional order. A typical approach is to select the estimator which exhibits the minimum variance, so, we measure the variance of the estimator just derived and we select the value for α to achieve the minimum variance.
We found the variance of the estimator in this way: we performed 10,000 successful tests using the standard image set (Lena, camera man, baboon, among others), then, we computed the variance; Fig. 5 shows the results for several values of the derivative order (α), the same plot shows that α = 1 2 corresponds to the minimum variance, for that reason, we will use the half-derivative in the rest of this paper.
By letting α = √ π ; then, the gain estimator is:
We found that in most cases, the numerical evaluation of (55) leads to a complex number; the real part of (55) is the correlation detector scaled by a constant, however, the imaginary part of the equation exhibits an interesting behavior: the system response is high whenever it finds a watermark whereas it has a very low (almost zero) response when the host has no watermark, for this reason, the complex part of the equation will be used as a watermark detector, then we define the watermark detector for the fractional VOLUME 6, 2018 order α as:
This is a biased detector, so, by subtracting in this way, the detector becomes unbiased:
Finally, the watermark must be detected using the noisy signal at the receiver (y * i ) as, so we get:
Finding a threshold equation is a difficult task since computing the expected value and variance of (59) is not straightforward; however, in order to detect watermarks, we propose to use the following threshold equation:
The rationale behind this equation is: first, the threshold must be proportional to the energy of the host (σ 2 ), also, if noise increases, then the entropy increases too, so, the equation must be proportional to entropy, both σ 2 and H are computed from the watermarked signal, in addition, the bias ( ) must escalate those variables making them bigger, then, to reduce the effect of the bias, it must divide the equation. Next, calculate the square root because the equation will follow the detector equation which also has a square root. Finally, k p is a constant of proportionality. Fig. 6 shows the method for detecting watermarks using our equations, compare Fig. 4 and Fig. 6 for a better idea of the differences to previous proposals.
In the next section, we describe the experimental results, those tests will support the proposed fractional detector. 
VI. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In this section, we present the results of a series of tests performed to verify system's reliability. We analyze several scenarios, first, the case when the embedding domain is the spatial domain, and the watermark is binary, then we analyze the case of the spatial domain and the watermark is Gaussian, then, we will review the case when the embedding domain comprises the DCT coefficients, and we will finally present the case when the embedding domain is computed by using the SVD. We are looking for to prove that a watermark system derived using fractional calculus perform better than a watermarking system based on the cross-correlation equation.
The first test compares the system response of both the original and the modified system. This experiment was divided in the following steps: First, generate 1,000 pseudorandom keys and then we choose arbitrarily key number 500, embed the watermark generated using random key 500; Then, using the decoder, detect the watermark using both the original system and the tweaked system and record the results.
Another test compares the system response of both systems when the watermarked signal was attacked. This test comprises the following steps: Perform an attack to the watermarked signal, it then use both the original and the tweaked systems and record the successful detection rate.
Attacks included noise addition, JPEG compression, cropping, scaling, average filter, the median filter. Finally, we repeated the test for the DCT and SVD domains.
The image set used in the benchmark comprised the 10,000 images of the BOWS database used for this competition, all images used in this database grayscale and their size is 512 × 512 pixels. We used (59) and (60) as the fractional detector equations whereas we used (2) and (4) as the detection equations for the integer detector.
Parameter k p in (60) will be proposed for each embedding domain and these values were found through experimentation. VOLUME 6, 2018 
A. SPATIAL DOMAIN WITH BINARY WATERMARK
The encoder embedded a binary watermark related to key number 500 using (1), we set the embedding gain to g = 5, this value gives a distortion measure of 34.15 dB (using the PSNR), even when it seems a severe distortion, this is a typical value for digital video and imaging applications. The two systems detect the watermark, Fig. 7 shows the result of the embedding test.
We performed a detection test; this test comprised the following steps: Chose a watermark (in this case, the 500-th watermark) among several watermarks. Then, we let k p = 1 1,200,000 , the decoder detects the watermark using eq. (59). Fig. 8 shows the system response. The modified system that uses the detector defined in (6) was used for detecting watermarks, again, the embedded watermark was related to key number 500. Fig. 8 shows the resulting figure of merit; a close inspection of Fig. 8b reveals that detection for any other watermark is almost zero.
The first test suggest positive results, we present the results of several tests that include attacks. In the first test we applied an average filter to the watermarked image set, we repeated the test for different window sizes of the filter, the window sizes used for this test were: 3 × 3, 5 × 5 and 7 × 7; the results of the benchmark are condensed in Fig. 9 and 10 . Next, we performed a similar test, this time using a median filter, again window sizes of the filter were: 3 × 3, 5 × 5 and 7 × 7. Fig. 9b shows a bar plot of the results.
The next test was the scaling attack which is an attack that first changes the size of the image to make a reduction of its original size and then, image size is restored to its original state, for example, a 50% scaling attack reduces the 512×512 pixels image to a 256 × 256 and then upscales the size to obtain a 512 × 512 image. The test is focused on this kind of scaling attack since it is very aggressive. Results of this test are shown in Fig.9c .
The cropping attack was performed in this way: the attacker removes some portions of the image and preserves the pixels within a square in the center of the image; Fig. 9d is a plot of the relation between successful detections versus the percentage of preserved pixels.
Another test was the random rows and columns replacement which was implemented in this paper in this way: pick a number z at random (1 ≤ z ≤ 512), then, copy the z-th row to the row z + 1, and copy the column z to the z + 1 column. An attack labeled as (m, n) mean that m rows and n columns were replaced. Fig. 9e shows the results for various (m, n) replaced rows and column. A similar attack was random row and columns removal. this attack was carried out in this way: choose a number z at random, then the z-th row was removed, and then, the z-th column was removed; in this case (m, n) means that m rows and n columns were removed; resulting image is smaller than the original, so, the attacker resizes the image to match the size of the original watermarked image, the results of this attack are shown in Fig. 9f .
Noise addition attacks were also performed, the first noise attack added the salt and pepper noise to the watermarked image; Fig. 10a shows a plot of detection percentage versus different noise densities. Another noise attack was the Gaussian noise addition, the noise mean was set to zero and the test was carried out for several variance values, results in Fig. 10b show a plot of detection percentage versus noise variance. Finally, the speckle noise attack was added to the watermarked image considering several noise variance values, the Fig.10c show the percentage of detection versus speckle noise variance.
The last of the attacks considered in the tests was the JPEG compression. In this test the watermarked images were compressed and the successful detection percentage was computed and compared to the compression quality parameter as shown in Fig. 10d .
B. SPATIAL DOMAIN WITH GAUSSIAN WATERMARK
The watermarking system in the spatial domain is not suitable for embedding Gaussian watermarks since it produces several false positives (the system detects a watermark that is not there); this makes the system unreliable by nature for the case of Gaussian watermarks; for this reason, the complete test results of the test benchmark are not presented in this section since those results might be statistically meaningless.
However, we observed interesting results; for example, if we let k p = 1 320,000 , the response of the integer and the fractional watermark detectors is as plotted in Fig. 11; Fig.11a shows the case of the integer detector; whereas the case of the fractional detector is shown in 11b.
The results for some attacks are presented in Fig.12a -h, the column on the left shows the integer detector, and the column on the right show the corresponding fractional detector response.
As seen in Fig 12a, c, e and g; the integer detector for Gaussian watermarks is not reliable, however, the fractional detector have a better discrimination capability because there are less false positives.
C. EXTENSION TO DCT DOMAIN
In this section, we explore the applications of the proposed fractional watermark detector to the DCT domain. Here, we let k p = 1 1,200 . The original algorithm used for this test is proposed in [4] , They proposed a watermarking system that inserts a watermark with a normal distribution {w 1 , w 2 , . . . , w N } into the full frame DCT spectrum; they select a set of coefficients that corresponds to the middle frequencies, the selected coefficients are in a diagonal from (O + 1)-th to the (O + N )-th and use the zig-zag ordering. Then, they modify the coefficients (v i ) of the DCT spectrum according to the following rule:
where g is the embedding gain, v X ,i is the watermarked coefficient. The detection equation and the corresponding threshold are (2) and (4) respectively.
We performed the same tests described in the last section for this scenario, Fig.15 and 16 show the results for the DCT domain test, those results, as the results for the spatial domain, show an improvement in watermark detection rate when fractional equations are used.
We made this test in this way: (59) and (60) replace (2) and (4), the resulting system is the fractional version of the algorithm. Then, we verified the detector response for both versions of the algorithm as was done in previous experiments, the system response to different watermarks is shown in Fig.13 .
D. EXTENSION TO THE SVD DOMAIN
A watermarking system for the SVD domain was also considered, we chose the algorithm proposed in [31] as the embedding and detection algorithm for this test, this algorithm is summarized as follows:
First, decompose the image A into its Singular Value Decomposition defined as: then, insert the watermark matrix W using an embedding gain a using the following equation:
Then, perform an additional SVD decomposition on matrix S W :
And compute the watermarked image according to:
Now, the decoder detects the watermark, this system detects watermarks by reversing the embedding steps: first, decompose the watermarked image using the SVD according to the following equation:
then, compute:
And the extracted watermark is:
The final step compute the correlation between the recovered watermark and the embedded watermark using (2) .
We repeated the same benchmark described in the previous section using both the integer and the fractional versions of this algorithm; however, since it is not a blind system, the system response is high and this test ended in a draw. We changed the system to make it semi-blind; so, it will not need the original data for watermark extraction, the modification consist of letting Y * = W * = D. Once again, we performed the same tests on the watermarked images, the results for the detector response for both the integer and the fractional detector are shown in Fig.14 .
We used k p = 1 2,000,000 for the benchmark. Fig.17 and 18 shows the results of the test.
VII. ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION
First, we used the half derivative since our tests revealed that the minimum variance of the detector is achieved for α = 0.5 according to the results showed in Fig. 5 . Second, unlike the works by other authors reviewed early in this paper who made too few test on their systems as discussed previously, the following results are supported by 10,000 tests for each attack (10 different attacks).
The results presented in the last section show that there is an improvement of the response of the system in the following cases: no attacks, average and median filtering, JPEG compression, row and column replacement, and row and column removal; the improvement is more notorious as the attack is more severe. On the other hand, this test ended in a draw for salt and pepper noise, and speckle noise. Also, the integer detector performed with an advantage in the case of Gaussian noise, and cropping attack.
In the case where no attack was applied, the results in Fig. 8a-b, show that the discrimination is notoriously better when a fractional detector is used compared to the integer equation. The results of the detection for the cases where no watermark was embedded are the product of the no orthogonal nature of the cover and the watermark, this suggest that the proposed detector equation mitigates the no orthogonality between the cover and the watermark. this statement is supported by the results shown in Fig. 11a-b,  Fig. 13a-b, and Fig. 14a-b which show regularity for several embedding domains.
The results for case of the spatial domain and binary watermarks show an improvement of the detection rate according to Fig. 9 and Fig. 10 where the fractional detector detected better in 6 out of 10 attacks, 2 attacks resulted in a draw and in 2 cases the fractional was close to the integer detector.
For the case of Gaussian watermarks, the system response was better as there are no false positives for several attacks in the attack free case, we choose not to conduct the benchmark test since the integer detector produces a lot of false positives so no fair comparison would be reached. However, we can see in Fig. 11a-b and Fig.12a-f , that the use of a fractional detector reduces the false positives in all cases.
In the case of the DCT domain; the fractional system performed better in all cases according to results shown in Fig.15 and Fig. 16 ; often, the system improvement is clear as the attack is more severe.
And for the SVD, the response of the system improved in the attack free scenario; in contrast, according to the results shown in Fig. 17 and Fig. 18 , the system exhibits an important improvement for the average filtering attack and the scaling attack, the median and cropping attack give a slight advantage and the response to other attacks ended in a draw.
VIII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper, we explored the application of fractional calculus to digital watermarking; for this purpose, we selected a set of algorithms, the selected algorithms detect the watermark using the cross correlation formula, and then, we replaced the equations of the watermark detector by the proposed fractional equations, several tests were carried out in the spatial domain, the DCT domain and the SVD domain.
The tests show that the fractional detectors identify watermarks better since they have a higher detection rate, in addition, the complexity of the system is almost the same. The modified systems improved in varying degrees; for some attacks, they exhibited little improvement, but, for other attacks the watermark detection capability improved.
Another important fact deduced from the experimental results is that the improvement is regular for the various embedding domains tested in this paper such as the spatial domain, the DCT domain, and the SVD domain
In conclusion, fractional calculus has benefits for watermarking, and as a result, future works might include to explore the application of fractional calculus to more algorithms, for example the case of the multiplicative rule for embedding the watermark, this would be interesting since it is used by several systems. Another possibility is to apply the fractional detector as a formula for pattern matching applications which can be a rich field for experimentation.
APPENDIX COMPLEMENTARY EXPERIMENTAL DATA
This appendix has complementary experimental data that the reader might need to check out closer.
